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Abstract.   Socialism is conceptualized as a society in which individuals cooperate, 
distinguished from capitalism, characterized as involving ubiquitous economic 
competition.  Here, I embed a formal model of cooperation in an Arrow-Debreu model, 
using the Kantian optimization protocol, and define a Walras-Kant equilibrium, in which 
firms maximize profits, consumers choose demands for commodities in the usual utility-
maximizing fashion, and the state rents capital to firms.  The labor-supply decision of 
workers, however, is arrived at using the cooperative protocol.  Incomes are redistributed 
through a flat income tax. Walras-Kant equilibria, with any desired degree of income 
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In my view, the principal problem that faces the socialist ideal is that we do not 
know how to design the machinery that would make it run. Our problem is not, 
primarily, human selfishness, but our lack of a suitable organizational technology: our 
problem is a problem of design. It may be an insoluble design problem, and it is a 
design problem that is undoubtedly exacerbated by our selfish propensities, but a 
design problem, so I think, is what we’ve got.    (G.A. Cohen, 2009) 
 
1. The design problem 
 
So wrote the philosopher G.A. Cohen in his last work, published posthumously.  To 
explicate the problem Cohen was describing:  we know that, if economic agents are self-
regarding, and a suitable set of conditions hold, then decentralized optimization in a 
capitalist economy by individuals and firms engenders, at equilibrium, a Pareto efficient 
allocation (the first theorem of welfare economics).  Suppose, now, that individuals wish 
to cooperate with each other, wish to behave in a solidaristic manner.  In a word, they 
possess a ‘socialist ethos.’   Is there an economic mechanism that can decentralize 
decision-making in a market economy, harnessing that cooperative impulse, to deliver a 
Pareto efficient and equitable allocation?   This is the Cohen design problem. 
In this article, I propose such a design.  Cooperation is modeled as Kantian 
optimization in the labor-supply decisions of workers.   Kantian optimization as a method 
of decentralizing cooperative behavior has been studied in Roemer [2010, 2015, in press].   
What’s new about the present analysis is inserting Kantian optimization into an Arrow-
Debreu economy, in which firms are privately owned and maximize profits in the 
traditional manner.     
The models presented can be thought of as describing a blueprint for market 
socialism.  The market-socialist tradition proposes to replace central planning with 
markets – or, in the design of Oscar Lange and Fred Taylor (1938)—with pseudo markets.  
In all models of market socialism heretofore, firms have been owned by the state, or by 
collectives of workers, or by other institutions, rather than by private citizens.   James 
Meade’s (1962) model of a ‘property-owning democracy’ achieved a degree of 
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equalization of capital income by providing incentives to distribute estates in a diffuse 
manner; he advocated both comprehensive education and a eugenics policy as 
instruments for equalizing labor incomes.   In my earlier proposal  (Roemer [1994]), all 
young adults were issued a property right to dividends in the nation’s publicly owned 
firms; firm shares could be traded on a special stock market, but could not be liquidated 
for cash.   The intention was, again, to equalize (roughly) the distribution of capital 
income.   In  Giacomo Corneo’s (in press) recent contribution, firms are again state-
owned by a ‘federal shareholder,’  profits escheat to the Treasury, and are used to finance 
demogrants to citizens and investment. 
Market-socialist models to date have not modeled cooperation or solidarity among 
citizens although these features are at the heart of the socialist ideal. Despite the 
importance of cooperation to the socialist vision,  existing models present no explicit 
conception of how people would behave differently (cooperatively) in a socialist society 
from how they behave (autarchically) in a capitalist economy.  In market-socialist models 
heretofore, agents are presumed to optimize in the same way that Arrow-Debreu agents 
optimize, maximizing a self-regarding preference order subject to constraints.   One 
might suppose that socialist citizens would possess preferences with an altruistic element 
in them.    However, I have not seen any market-socialist models with this property – and 
in any case, if an agent is small in the economy, it is unclear whether his having a 
preference order with an altruistic character would produce equilibria any different from 
one in which agents are entirely self-regarding.  (See Dufwenberg et al [2011].)  After all, 
if an agent is small, what difference would his altruistic contribution make, and would 
this small contribution outweigh the personal cost he sustains by making it?  The 
preferences of agents are standard and self-regarding in my proposal. 
  Income taxation is the redistributive mechanism here.   The key observation is that 
Kantian (as opposed to Nash) optimization in the labor-supply decision nullifies the usual 
deadweight loss incurred with income taxation.   Any degree of post-fisc income equality 
can be achieved without sacrificing Pareto efficiency.  The economic mechanism is 
decentralized, efficient, and as equal as citizens choose it to be, through a presumably 
democratic choice of the tax rate. 
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Combining an Arrow-Debreu structure with additive Kantian optimization offers a 
solution to Cohen’s design problem.   In section 2, I briefly review the definition of 
Kantian optimization, and define a Walras-Kant (W-K)  equilibrium with taxation.   In 
section 3, I present the welfare theorem:  under general conditions, Walras-Kant 
equilibria are Pareto efficient, at any tax rate.  Section 4 presents an example.  Section 5 
proves the existence of W-K equilibria at almost any tax rate.   Section 6 discusses the 
psychology of Kantian optimization and concludes. 
 
2. The proposed design1 
 
A. Kantian equilibrium in games 
I begin by reminding the reader of the definition of Kantian equilibrium in a game  
(Roemer [2009, 2015]).  Consider a game with n agents, each of whom plays a strategy 
  chosen from an interval  of real numbers.  Denote the payoff function of player i 
by .   
Definition 2.1  An additive Kantian equilibrium of the game  is a strategy profile 
 such that no player would like to add any scalar to all strategies; that is: 
 
 . (2.1) 
Mathematically, additive Kantian equilibrium has a similar structure to Nash 
equilibrium.  The difference is in the counterfactuals the agents contemplate when 
considering a deviation from a given strategy profile.  In Nash equilibrium each agent 
imagines changing her strategy while all other agents stand pat.   In Kantian equilibrium, 
each agent imagines changing all strategies in a symmetric manner.  In Nash optimization, 
agents imagine choosing their best option from different sets of counterfactual strategy 
profiles; in Kantian optimization, all agents imagine choosing their best option from the 
                                                 
1 Notational conventions:  Scalar variables are italic, vectors and matrices are boldface 
roman.  If  is a vector, then  .  Denote the  partial derivative of 
any real-valued function f  by  .   
May 31, 2017 4 
same set of counterfactual profiles.   Choosing their favorite strategy profile from a 
common set of counterfactuals is the mathematical form that solidarity/cooperation takes. 
 
Definition 2.3 A game  is (strictly) monotone increasing if for each i,   is 
(strictly) increasing in the strategies of all other players  . A game  is 
(strictly) monotone decreasing if for each i,  is (strictly) decreasing in the strategies of 
all other players.    
Monotone increasing games are ones with positive externalities – an example being 
where the strategies are contributions to a public good.   Monotone decreasing games are 
ones with negative externalities – an example being the tragedy of the commons. 
Any additive Kantian equilibrium of a strictly monotone game is Pareto efficient in 
the game.  Thus, Kantian optimization decentralizes an efficient solution of games with 
positive and negative externalities.  It solves free-rider problems. This provides a 
justification for viewing Kantian optimization as a model of cooperative behavior. 
 
B.  A labor-supply game 
 
(i)  The economic environment 
 I begin by defining an economic environment.   There are two produced private 
goods and a homogeneous kind of labor, measured in efficiency units.  There are two 
firms, each of which produces one of the goods from inputs of labor and capital, using 
production functions G and H respectively, which map  .  Worker i is endowed 
with  units of labor in efficiency units, and receives a profit share  from Firm l , for 
 . The state owns fractions  of firm  , and is endowed with  units of 
the capital good.   Good 1 is used both for consumption and capital, and Good 2 is a pure 
consumption good.  The state uses its capital to finance investment in the two firms, and 
the private agents spend their incomes on consumption of the two goods.  Private agent i 
has preferences over the two consumption goods and labor expended (in efficiency units) 
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represented by a utility function .  All activity takes place in a single 
period. 
 For purposes of expositional simplicity, I have specified an environment with two 
produced commodities and two firms.  All the results below generalize to any number of 
firms producing any number of commodities, in the obvious manner. 
  
 Firms are traditional – they are price-takers and demand capital and labor and 
supply commodities to maximize profits.  A flat tax at an exogenous rate  will be 
levied on all private incomes, with the tax revenues returned to the population as a 
demogrant.   Given their incomes (which consist of after-tax wages, capital income and 
the demogrant) and their labor supply,  producer-consumers choose the optimal 
commodity bundle in the classical way.   However, the determination of labor supply, 
and hence of income, is non-traditional – that is to say, the worker does not choose her 
labor supply in the Nash manner. A vector of labor supplies must be an additive Kantian 
equilibrium of a game to be defined below.  
 
(ii)   The game 
Let  be a price vector where   is the price of commodity l, w is the 
wage rate for labor in efficiency units, and  r is  the interest rate on capital.  Let 
be a labor supply vector by agent i to Firms 1 and 2.   Thus the vector of labors supplied 
to Firm G  is   and the vector of labors supplied to Firm H is 
 .  Fix the capital levels ,   of the two firms.   Define the 




where  the profits of the two firms are defined by: 
,   (2.3) 
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and  is the labor supplied to Firm l.  The last term on the r.h.s. of  (2.2) is the value of 
the demogrant, equal to the per capita share of total tax revenues (where taxes are levied 
on all private incomes but not on the state’s income).  
The income of the state is: 
  . (2.4) 
That is, the state receives its share of firms’ profits plus the return on its investment, but 
this is not taxed, which explains the specification of the demogrant in equation (2.2). 
Now suppose that every (private) agent were to increase her total labor by a constant 
, positive or negative.  Then i’s hypothetical income would be:  
 
  (2.5) 
where  fraction  of the total increase in labor  is allocated to Firm 1, and fraction 
 to Firm 2.  We need not adopt a rule for how each agent would allocate her 
additional labor  between the two firms, as this will turn out not to matter.  It is 
assumed that workers are price takers:  in particular, they take the wage w as given. 
A comment on the logic behind equation (2.5) is in order.  A Nash player, who 
chooses his labor supply while assuming all other labor supplies remain fixed, need not 
consider the effect of his labor-supply decision on either the profits of firms in which he 
works or owns equity, or upon the demogrant, if the economy is large.  Hence, our 
practice in Nash-type analysis is to ignore these effects.  But in Kantian optimization, the 
counterfactual the worker envisages is that all workers change their labor supplies in the 
same amount as the change he is contemplating, and hence consistency in the thought 
experiment requires that we alter the labor supplies to firms, and the value of the 
demogrant, accordingly.   Hence, the formulation of equation (2.5). 
At this counterfactual labor supply by worker i, , given her income as 
specified by (2.5) , let the agent compute her commodity demands, which are the solution 
of the program: 
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    (2.6) 
Denote the solution to this program by  , where I 
abbreviate with the notation  .   
We now define the payoff functions of a game.   The payoff to agent i is his utility 
at prices  if the capital invested in the firms is  , and  the vector of 
labor supplies  were to determine wage income, profit income, and the value 
of the demogrant, that is: 
  . (2.7)  
Incorporated in the payoff function is the assumption that at her personal part of the 
community effort vector, agent i has chosen her commodity demands optimally, given the 
income generated. 
Thus, given a vector of prices , and the ownership shares of firms,  a 
game whose strategies are effort/labor supplies is defined, denoted   .  We can define 
its additive Kantian equilibrium, which is a vector of labor supplies   
satisfying (2.1): that is to say,  a vector   such that: 
 
 .  (2.8) 
 
C.    Walras-Kant equilibrium with taxation 
The data of the economy are .    
is the state’s endowment of the capital good, which will finance the firm’s investment.  It 
is useful, for conceptualizing Pareto efficiency, to define the ‘utility function of the state,’ 
which is: 
     .     (2.9) 
That is, the state cares only about Good 1, which it uses in its role as the capital good. 
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We now define a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium at tax rate t, to consist of:   
i. a price vector , 
ii. labor and capital demands by the two firms of  and  , respectively, 
iii. labor supplies  by all workers i to Firms 1 and 2, 
iv. for all private agents i, commodity demands  for the outputs of Firms 1 and 
2, resp.,  such that: 
v. at given prices,  maximizes profits of Firm l, for l = 1, 2, 
vi. the labor supply vector , where  ,  constitutes an 
additive Kantian equilibrium at the given prices of the game  , as defined in 
(2.7),  
vii.   maximizes the utility of agent i, given prices, her labor supply, and her 
income, given by (2.2),   
viii. a supply of capital    by the state to the two firms that maximizes its utility  
subject to its budget constraint  at given firm demands of labor, and  
ix. all markets clear; that is,   ,   
 , and  . 
 
The depreciation rate of capital is set at zero. Thus, at the beginning of the next period 
the state’s endowment of the capital good will be   (see eqn. (2.4)).   Indeed 
condition (viii) of the definition of equilibrium is superfluous, and is included only for 
completeness.   For at equilibrium,  the firms have maximized joint profits, at the given 
price vector, which maximizes the state’s income, subject to condition that  .   
 
3.   The first welfare theorem for market socialism 
The appropriate concept of Pareto efficiency will be called investment constrained 
Pareto efficiency  (ICPE).    An allocation is ICPE if there is no other feasible allocation 
that makes at least some agent better off without harming any agent, where the state is 
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included as an agent.  Since the model is not intertemporal, it is important to qualify the 
kind of Pareto efficiency that can be realized:  citizens cannot trade off future 
consumption against present consumption in the model, and hence we cannot speak of 
efficiency in the full sense.    To say this more straightforwardly:  the state’s investment 
is determined by its endowment of capital, not by any considerations of the population’s 
future welfare.    We know that both the Soviet Union and post-1949-China probably 
invested too much, committing their populations to excessively low consumption.   That 
can happen in this model, too.   
 It is easy to show that, with differentiability, an interior allocation2 is ICPE 
exactly when: 
   (3.1) 
 where  , etc.  
 Conditions (a)-(d) specify feasibility; conditions (e)-(g) specify efficiency.  
 
Theorem 1.   Assume differentiability of the production functions and the utility functions.  
Assume that the production functions are concave and the utility functions are strictly 
concave.   Let  comprise a Walras-Kant (additive) 
equilibrium at any income tax rate  .    Then the induced allocation is investment-
constrained Pareto efficient. 
                                                 
2 An allocation is called interior if all private agents consume positive amounts of both 
commodities and leisure, and all supply positive amounts of labor (but it is not necessary 
that any agent supplies labor to both firms).   
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 At a Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t,  profit-maximization gives: 
  , (3.2) 
and clearing of the capital market tells us that .  Therefore, it follows from  
(3.1) that an interior equilibrium is ICPE if and only if: 
   (3.3) 
 .  
Proof of Theorem 1: 
1. Although the theorem’s statement assumes the equilibrium is interior, this is easy to 
relax, with a concomitant alteration of the first-order conditions.   
2.  Consider the program: 
     
where E  and I are fixed.    Denote the solution  .  The f.o.c.s for the 
solution of the program are: 
   (3.4) 
By the implicit function theorem, the functions   are differentiable and their 
derivatives are given by: 
  , (3.5) 
  , (3.6) 
  and (3.7) 
   
 
 ,   (3.8) 
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where   is the leading principal sub-matrix of order two of the Hessian of the function 
,  and the superscript  indicates ‘transpose.’  Note that the implicit function theorem 
indeed applies because  is negative definite by the strict concavity of , and so the 
denominators of equations (3.5)-(3.8) do not vanish. 
4. Now the labor-supply vector is an interior additive Kantian equilibrium of the game 
  if and only if : 
 
for all i:   
 
 for  .  (3.9) 
This statement reduces to: 
 ,   (3.10) 
where  .  
5. From (2.5), calculate that:
 
(3.11) 
Since the two partial derivatives   of the firms’ profit functions are zero, 
by profit maximization, and  , (3.11) reduces to: 
  , (3.12) 
for any t.    It is now evident why we did not have to specify how workers allocate the 
increment ρ in labor between the two firms:  that allocation does not affect the validity of 
(3.12). 
 We therefore write the condition for Kantian equilibrium of labor supplies, 
equation (3.10), as: 
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   .    (3.13) 
6.  We now expand equation (3.13) by making a sequence of substitutions: (i) substitute 
the expressions for the four derivatives of the  and  functions from (3.5) through 
(3.8), and (ii)  eliminate   via the substitution  , the f.o.c. from (3.4).   So 
doing reduces (3.13) to: 
    (3.14) 
where  , which is a negative number.   
Finally, divide both sides of equation (3.14) by the positive number , simplify, and 
calculate that that equation reduces to: 
   , (3.15) 
which is one of the two required efficiency conditions for agent i. 
7. Now substitute for  in the last equation using  , yielding: 
 
.  (3.16) 
By equations (3.15), (3.16) and (3.2),  the theorem is proved.   ν 
   
The key move in the proof is to show that, regardless of the tax rate, when a worker 
thinks of all workers as varying their labor supplies in the amount she is contemplating 
varying her own, she internalizes the externality generated by her labor-supply choice – a 
choice that affects firm profits and tax revenues.   Her own action causes a negligible 
change in these magnitudes, but of course the aggregate effect of many small changes is 
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significant.  The additive counterfactual in the universal change in labor supplies and 
affine income taxation combine in such a way as to exactly cancel the deadweight loss of 
taxation that afflicts Nash optimization in the labor-supply decision.  (This is the meaning 
of equation (3.12), the key to the proof.)   This kind of pairing – associating a specific 
cooperative optimization protocol with a particular allocation rule, where the two 
together deliver Pareto efficiency – is a feature of Kantian equilibrium in simpler (non-
market) environments, as studied in Roemer (in press).   What’s new here is combining 
additive Kantian optimization with markets. 
A remark on why the incentive problem, causing deadweight losses in the standard 
model, does not bite here.   Consider, for dramatic effect, an income tax rate of one, and 
suppose every worker is supplying zero labor  (as she would in the standard model at this 
tax rate).   But here, by using the Kantian optimization protocol, a worker balances her 
share of an increase in income that would occur if all workers increased their labor 
supply from zero to some small positive ρ against her (very small) disutility of labor at 
zero.  The trade-off is usually worth it.   Consequently, at the Kantian equilibrium, even 
at a tax rate of unity, (most) workers will supply a positive amount of labor. 
 
4.  An example of Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium 
Because capital allocation is passive in this model, let’s simplify by studying an 
economic environment where the capital inputs are fixed, there is no state,  and we model 
production as a function of labor only: 
   (3.17) 
Agent i’s endowment of efficiency units of labor is  .  There are n agents, and the total 
endowment of labor is  .    We let  for all .  We set 
 .   We normalize the price vector by choosing  There is no market for 
capital and hence no interest rate. 
 An interior allocation is a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium at income tax rate t 
when the allocation is Pareto efficient, the income of i is given by (2.2), and markets 
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clear.  (The critical condition that the labor supplies comprise a Kantian equilibrium of 
the game   is embedded in the efficiency conditions, as the proof of theorem 1 shows.)   
We write these conditions as: 
   (3.18) 
and (2.2) holds for all i.     By (3.18), the post-fisc income of agent i is given by 
 .  Hence, (2.2) can be written: 
  . (3.19) 
 
By adding up the equations over all i in (3.18), we have: 
 
  (3.20). 
Now using the expressions for commodity prices in (3.18), we write these equations as: 
 
.  (3.21) 
System (3.21) comprises two equations in the two unknowns  and  ; the solution 
must be a vector .   Thus total production at Walras-Kant 
equilibrium for this economy, if such exists, is independent of the tax rate t.  Profits are 
also independent of t.  Taxation simply redistributes a fixed output of commodities.   
 Parameterize the example with  ,   We have not 
yet specified the individual endowments  .    We solve (3.21): 
   . (3.22) 
Profits are positive for both firms, and comprise 28% of national income, a reasonable 
approximation to reality.   
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To complete the analysis, we must specify the   and solve for  .   Rewrite 
equation (3.19) as: 
 
 . (3.23) 
Examination shows that equation (3.23) possesses an interior solution in which  
  for all i exactly when: 
for all i,    . (3.24) 
If, on the other hand, (3.24) is false for some i, then there is no interior equilibrium.    
It is of interest to compute the lower bound on the labor endowment that will 
guarantee an interior Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t.    From (3.24) , this depends 












Table.  The minimum value of  supporting an interior Walras-Kant equilibrium 
as a function of the tax rate 
Recall that the average labor endowment with our parameterization is  .   From 
the table, a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium exists where all agents work regardless of 
the distribution of individual labor endowments, as long as  .  But as the tax rate 
rises, the restriction on the distribution of labor endowments bites.   
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  For tax rates larger than 40%, equilibrium still exists, but workers who are 
insufficiently skilled do not work.   We illlustrate with a second paramaterization.  The 
utility functions and production parameters are as before, but we examine an economy 
with two agents  (n =2),  where  .  If both agents work, then   
are given by (3.22).  Let us look for an equilibrium where  .   Both agents must then 
have the same after-tax income. Inequality (3.24) is false for agent 1, so there is no 
equilibrium at   where both agents work.    We therefore set agent 2’s labor supply to 
zero:  .   The other equations characterizing a Walras-Kant equilibrium are: 
   (3.25) 
The two equations in the first line say the marginal rates of substition for the agent with 
positive labor supply equal the correct price ratios; the second line says the marginal rates 
of transformation equal the correct price ratios; the third line is true because when the tax 
rate is 1, both agents have the same (post-fisc) income, and so consume the two 
commodities identically; the fourth line expresses market-clearing for the two 
commodities; and the fifth line expresses the efficiency condition for the agent who 
supplies zero labor.  The solution is given by: 
 
  (3.26) 
 
5.  Existence of Walras-Kant equilibrium 
We first note: 
Proposition 2   Let  be a Walrasian equilibrium at 
  Then it is also an additive Walras-Kant equilibrium at   
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Proof: 
We know the allocation is Pareto efficient by the (usual) first welfare theorem.  The 
income equation (2.2) holds by definition of Walrasian equilibrium.   We need only show 
that the labor supplies comprise a Kantian equilibrium, which is to say, that equation 
(3.13) holds.   But we have shown that this is equivalent to the efficiency conditions that 
.  These conditions hold by hypothesis, and the claim is proved.    ν 
We assume: 
Assumption A 
 (i)   are unbounded, concave, homothetic, and the Inada conditions hold, and 
(ii) all consumer preferences are representable by strictly concave, differentiable 
utility functions, and both commodities are normal goods for all consumers. 
 
Theorem 3  Let an economic environment  be given and let Assumption 
A hold. Suppose that  for all (private) agents and that .  Then a 
Walras-Kant equilibrium exists for any . 
 
Let  be the 3-simplex of price vectors .  Denote the boundary 
(interior) of the simplex by  .  We define a correspondence on the domain .  
Let Q can be any real number, and  a positive continuous function on .   Let: 
   (4.1) 
Now define  by:  
  , (4.2) 
where    may be positive, zero, or negative.  Finally, define: 
  .  (4.3) 
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Lemma 4  Let  and   . Let  be  continuous 
functions for all i.   If Assumption A(ii) holds then  is a (non-empty) continuous 
function mapping  .  
Proof: 
1.  It suffices to show that   is single-valued and continuous for any i. By strict 
concavity of preferences, the correspondence  is single-valued and continuous on . 
Suppose that  contains two elements; i.e., there are allocations   
  for  , with .   It 
follows that: 
  , (4.4) 
where  , etc.   Therefore the quantities on the right-hand sides of the two 
equations in (4.4) are equal, implying that: 
  , (4.5) 
and so   (note by assumption).  Therefore :  
  (4.6) 
and so either  .   But since  for , it 
must be that   because both commodities are normal goods, and the 
consumer’s wealth (check the definition of  )  is greater at   than at  .  This 
contradiction proves that  contains at most one element. 
2.  Next we show  contains at least one element.      is a planar 
segment. We say a point  lies above (resp. below) the planar segment 
 if it lies in the positive orthant and  (resp., 
).     Note that the points on planar segment 
    
lie entirely below (or, at one point, on) the planar segment   because: 
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  . (4.7) 
It therefore follows that  lies below (or possibly on) the planar segment 
 .   On the other hand, for large values of Q,  the points of  
   
must lie entirely above  .   Since   is a continuous function of Q,  by the 
Berge maximum theorem, it follows that there exists at least one value of Q such that 
.  Thus,   is a well-defined function. 
3.  Continuity of  follows from Berge’s maximum theorem.  ν 
  
Proof of Theorem 3: 
0.   The theorem is true for   by Proposition 2, since a Walrasian equilibrium exists 
at   under the stated premises.   Henceforth, we assume  . 
1. The proof is an adaptation of Mas-Colell, Winston and Green’s (1995) proof of 
existence of competitive equilibrium (Proposition 17.C.1).  We will define a 
correspondence that maps the 3-simplex into itself.   We first define the 
correspondence on .  Given a price vector  define 
 to be the solution of: 
 
  (4.8) 
Note that, by Assumption A(i) the solution exists and satisfies: 
  .  
2. The profits of the two firms and the value of the demogrant are defined at  
.   Profits are positive for any price vector  . 
We now consider the budget constraints of individuals:  
 
  (4.9) 
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and the budget constraint of the state at the firms’ demands: 
  . (4.10) 
Let  equal the sum of the last two terms on the r.h.s. of (4.9). By the theorem’s 
premise, all private agents have positive income at any , because the 
state does not receive all the firms’ profits by assumption, and the tax rate is positive. 
  are positive continuous functions, and so the premises of Lemma 4 hold; therefore 
the functions  are defined and continuous.  Henceforth, we write 
 . 
4. Define the excess demand functions at a vector : 
  , (4.11) 
where the points  for .   Define the excess demand function for the 
economy by: 
  . (4.12) 
Next, define the correspondence   by: 
   . 
 is non-empty and convex because it consists of the maximanda of a linear function 
on a compact set. 
5. Finally,  for  , define: 
 .    (4.13) 
6. By summing the budget constraints in (4.9) and (4.10), we calculate Walras’ Law for 
this economy, defined on  : 
 . (4.14) 
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7. Suppose  is a fixed point of .   p cannot be on the boundary of the 
simplex, since we would have  , a contradiction.   Therefore  .   It 
follows by the definition of   and Walras’ Law that   for all  .  This 
implies that  .   Suppose one of the components of   were negative.   This 
would imply the failure of Walras’ Law, a contradiction.  Hence .  Consequently  
 , and all markets clear.  We deduce  from the 
premise  that  .   
8.   Associated with these prices is an allocation  , with  for all 
 .  We must show that is an additive Kantian equilibrium at prices p.   
This follows immediately from the definition of the functions  , because the first-order 
conditions for Kantian equilibrium, which were derived in steps 5,6, and 7 of the proof of 
Theorem 1,  follow from the definition of  , given that
.    
9.  Thus, a fixed point of  is a Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t.  To show the 
existence of a fixed point, we need to check that the premises of Kakutani’s fixed point 
theorem hold.    is obviously convex-valued.  Upper-hemi-continuity of  at any point 
in  follows quickly.   
 Finally, we examine u.h.c. of   at  points on the boundary of the simplex. 
Suppose .   Suppose the sign pattern of   is (+,+,0,+).  We 
have  .    Eventually   are positive and bounded 
away from zero, and  .  
 We must show that .   Without loss of generality, we may 
assume that   for all j.   Denote the excess demands at  by 
 .   We will show that, for j sufficiently large 
 ,   (4.15) 
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 and this will imply that, for sufficiently large j,   .    To show (4.15), 
we will show that  , for  . 
  We show that  . We know  , because  , and so the 
firms will demand unbounded amounts of labor, while the supply of labor is bounded.  If 
  were bounded above, we would be done.  So we suppose that  is 
unbounded.  It follows that for at least one firm – say the G firm -- 
 .   But by profit maximization,  .  By 
homotheticity of G  (Assumption A(i)), the points   must eventually lie below 
any ray in the positive quadrant of   space. This implies that , as 
required. 
 To show  for  , it suffices to show  because the 
demand for the two commodities cannot grow faster than total profits (wage income goes 
to zero).  We show  .   Let  j be large and  .   Then: 
 , (4.16) 
by concavity of G, where  , etc., and so: 
    
 . (4.17) 
Now let  , but j more slowly than J.   We know from above that  , and 
 , and  .   Therefore the right-
hand side of (4.17) approaches zero, and so  , as was to be proved. 
 We examine one more case on the boundary of the simplex.  Suppose the sign 
pattern of   is (0,+,0,+).   Then  .    We know that 
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 and eventually  are bounded away from zero.  If eventually  
is greater than , then eventually .    
Firm 2  eventually demands huge amounts of labor, because the wage goes to zero but the 
price of output is significantly positive.  The profits of Firm 1 go to zero since  .   
These facts imply that   and so, as in the first case examined above,   
dominates the other excess demands, as required. 
 The other cases of points on  yield to similar analysis.   Hence, the premises of 
Kakutani’s theorem hold, and a fixed point in  , which is a Walras-Kant equilibrium, 
exists. ν   
 A comment on investment in the model is called for.  In the approach I’ve taken, 
only the state invests.    Could private agents invest in the firms as well, and preserve the 
efficiency result?  The answer is yes, if the profile of investments is also an additive 
Kantian equilibrium.    I elected not to follow this route here, both for reasons of 
simplicity, and because it strikes me as more credible that workers can learn to adopt 
Kantian optimization in their labor-supply decisions than in their investment decisions.  
Perhaps I am here influenced by the observation that workers have a history of 
cooperation, and investors do not, at least to the same extent. 
 
6. The psychology of Kantian optimization  
 
The differentia specifica of the model here proposed, within the class of market-
socialist models, is Kantian optimization in the labor-supply decision.   I have argued that, 
because socialism has always been conceived of as a society with enhanced cooperation 
among its members, this formalization of what cooperation entails should be welcome. 
That a more robust form of cooperation has not been included in designs for market 
socialism heretofore is due, I suggest,  to the lack of a formal representation of 
cooperative behavior.   
  It will surely be the case that skepticism regarding my proposal will focus upon the 
realism of supposing that a large population of producers can learn to optimize their 
labor-supply decisions in the Kantian manner.    There are, I think, three necessary 
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conditions for the feasibility of such behavior: desire, understanding, and trust.   Citizens 
must desire to cooperate with each other, they must view themselves as part of a 
solidaristic society, whose members believe that cooperation in economic decisions is the 
modus operandi. But why should the Kantian optimization protocol appeal to people as 
the preferred mode of cooperation?   I think the motivation must be in the conception of 
fairness or solidarity embodied in the statement,  “I should only reduce (increase) my 
labor supply if I would like all others to reduce (increase) their labor supplies in like 
manner3.”   Our brains love symmetry, and fairness always, I believe, involves a 
conception of symmetrical treatment.   Secondly, people must understand that 
cooperation in the labor-supply decision is achieved by each knowing that if all increase 
their labor supply by a small increment, each person’s income increases by that increment, 
because what a worker loses in the tax on her wage, she gets back in the increased 
demogrant.  They should also understand that, if workers optimize according to Kantian 
protocol,  efficiency is separated from distributional considerations.  Thirdly, they must 
trust that others will behave cooperatively as well, and will not take advantage of their 
own cooperative behavior, by optimizing in the Nash manner.  If these three conditions 
are met, then the method of implementing cooperative behavior is not difficult:  each 
worker should choose his labor supply to equalize his marginal rates of substitution 
between commodities and labor to his gross wage, rather than his after-tax wage.  Rather 
than thinking “Is the disutility of an extra day’s work worth to me the after-tax wage 
increment?” the worker should ask whether it is worth the gross wage increment.   If we 
believe people are capable of optimizing in the Nash manner, optimizing in the Kantian 
manner is no more cognitively demanding, if the necessary conditions are met. 
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